Un’ampia rassegna di articoli sulla logica contenuti in riviste scientifiche.

P.K. Basu, «Theory-ladenness of evidence: a case study from history of chemistry», Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, vol. 34, pp. 351-368, 2003.

J. Bogen e J. Woodward, «Saving the phenomena», The Philosophical Review, vol. 97, pp. 303-352, 1988.

Y. Cohen, «Ravens and Relevance», Erkenntnis, vol. 26 (2), , pp. 153-179, 1987.

P. Frank, «The Place of Logic and Metaphysics in the Advancement of Modern Science», Philosophy of Science, vol. 15 (4), 275-286, 1948.

G. Gigerenzer e D.G. Goldstein, «Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of bounded rationality», Psychological Review, vol. 103, pp. 650-669, 1996.

G. Gigerenzer, «Why Heuristics Work», Perspective on psychological science, vol. 3 (1), pp. 1-29. 2008.

I.J. Good, «The Paradox of Confirmation», The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 11 (42), pp. 145-149, 1960.

I.J. Good, «The White Shoe is a Red Herring», The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 17 (4), p. 322, 1967.

D. Kahneman e A. Tversky, «Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk», Econometrica, vol. 47 (2), pp. 263-292, 1979.

D. Kahneman e A. Tversky, «Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions», The Journal of Business, vol. 59 (4), parte 2, pp. S251-S278, 1986.

D. Kahneman e A. Tversky, «Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty», Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, vol. 5 (4), pp. 297-323, 1992.

P. Mahler, «Inductive Logic and the Ravens Paradox», Philosophy of Science, vol. 66 (1), pp. 50-70, 1999.

T. Nickles, «What Is a Problem That We May Solve It?», Synthese, vol. 47 (1), pp. 85-118, 1981.

T. Nickles, Remarks on the Use of History as Evidence. Synthese, vol. 69 (2), pp. 253-266, 1986.

K. Popper e D. Miller, «A Proof of the Impossibility of Inductive Probability», Nature, vol. 302, pp. 687-88, 1983.

I. Scheffler e N.J. Goodman, «Selective Confirmation and the Ravens», Journal of Philosophy, vol. 69 (3), pp. 78-83, 1972.

L.E. Talalay, «Rethinking the function of clay figurine legs from neolithic Greece: An argument by analogy», American Journal of Archaeology, vol. 91 (2), pp. 161-169, 1987.

D.H. Wolpert, «The lack of a priori distinctions between learning algorithms», Neural Computation, vol. 8 (7), pp. 1341-1390, 1996.

D.H. Wolpert e W. Macready, «No free lunch theorems for optimization», IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation, vol. 1 (1), pp. 67-82, 1997.

A. Wylie, «Simple analogy and the role of relevance assumptions: Implications of archaeological practice», International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 2 (2), pp. 134-150, 1988.

Per ulteriori direzioni di ricerca: Pixel Logica